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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-4013
________________

SHARON L. BARZESKI,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States Tax Court
(Tax Court No. 7237-05)
Tax Court Judge: Honorable John F. Dean
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 27, 2006
Before: BARRY, STAPLETON AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed March 28, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Sharon L. Barzeski did not file income tax returns for tax years 2001,
2002, and 2003. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the taxes due for
those years based on Barzeski’s wages and interest income reported on W-2 and 1099-

INT forms submitted by third parties, and issued a notice of deficiency to her. Barzeski
filed a petition in the United States Tax Court to contest the notice. In her petition, she
argued that the notice of deficiency was issued in error because she was not a person
obligated to file a tax return. In support of her position, she claimed that the Internal
Revenue Service does not use a valid control number from the Office of Management and
Budget on its forms. She also contended that the modification, over time, of the amount
of income exempt from taxation violated the Ex Post Facto clause. The Commissioner
filed a motion to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim. The Commissioner also
moved for sanctions pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6673.
Upon consideration of the Commissioner’s motions, the Tax Court ordered
Barzeski to file an amended petition to specifically identify the alleged errors in the
deficiency determination and to separately state the facts on which she based her claims
of error. Barzeski filed an amended petition, in which she elaborated on the two
arguments in her first petition and added the additional claim that the Commissioner had
not proven that she had received income for the years in question.1 After a hearing, the
Tax Court dismissed Barzeski’s petition and imposed a penalty of five thousand dollars.
Barzeski appeals. The parties have filed cross-motions for sanctions, and Barzeski has
filed a motion to strike the Commissioner’s motion for sanctions.

1

In relation to this claim, Barzeski disputed that the term “wages” means
compensation for labor. However, in her brief before us, she concedes that she “works
and earns income in the form of wages.” (Appellant’s Brief at 2.)
2

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1). We exercise plenary
review over the Tax Court’s conclusions of law, and review the Tax Court’s factual
findings for clear error. See PNC Bancorp, Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 212 F.3d
822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000). We review the Tax Court’s imposition of a penalty under § 6673
for an abuse of discretion. See Sauers v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 771 F.2d 64, 65
(3d Cir. 1985).
We will affirm because the Tax Court properly dismissed Barzeski’s petition and
did not abuse its discretion in imposing a penalty. Barzeski did not advance claims to
undermine the Commissioner’s determinations in the notice of deficiency, which are
presumptively correct, see Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 (1935). She did not
even assert clear and concise claims of specific error to meet her pleading obligation
under Rule 34 of the Tax Court Rules. Instead, she put forth frivolous and groundless
arguments to protest the imposition of income tax. See, e.g., United States v. Wunder,
919 F.2d 34, 38 (6th Cir. 1990). We agree with the Tax Court that no extended
discussion is necessary, see Crain v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 737 F.2d 1417, 1417
(5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), and hold that the Tax Court properly dismissed Barzeski’s
petition. Also, in light of Barzeski’s arguments, we discern no abuse of discretion in the
Tax Court’s imposition of a § 6673 penalty on Barzeski.
The Commissioner’s motion for sanctions is granted in the sum of $1000 (one
thousand dollars), and Barzeski’s motion to strike and her motion for sanctions is denied.

